Thailand’s Automotive Market 2026: Japanese Share Falls Below 70%, a Chinese EV Maker Collapses — and What Became of Toyota’s China Sourcing

Thailand's Automotive Market

Introduction

In August 2025, we published “Toyota’s EV Procurement Transformation in Thailand.” The report started from a Nikkei story dated August 2, 2025. According to Nikkei, Toyota had introduced the Chinese interior-materials maker Wuhu Yuefei to Thailand’s Summit Group (a seat and auto parts group, separate from Thai Summit Group discussed later), the two companies had set up a joint venture in Thailand in January 2025, and Toyota was targeting a 30% cost reduction for a new electrified model planned for Southeast Asia around 2028. Our conclusion at the time was that the structural changes visible in 2025 would take full shape in 2026.

By October 2026, enough data has been published to test that view. This report reviews Thailand’s automotive market against the latest figures: what our earlier assessment got right, where it needs updating, and two issues our earlier report did not cover. The first is mounting shakeout pressure among Chinese EV players. The second is the set of localization conditions attached to Thailand’s EV and hybrid incentives, and how their enforcement has changed since. The report stands on its own; no familiarity with the earlier piece is assumed.

Market Share: Japanese Brands Fall Below 70%, and the Slide Continued in 2026

Start with sales. According to Toyota Motor Thailand (TMT, announced January 30, 2026), Thailand’s domestic new-vehicle sales in 2025 rose 8.5% to 621,166 units, the first annual increase in three years. The market recovered, but its brand mix changed sharply. JETRO’s tally (February 5, 2026) shows the following for 2025:

  • All vehicles: the combined share of Japanese brands fell from 76.7% to 69.3%, a drop of 7.4 points. The Chinese share rose from 11.6% to 18.2%. Press reports based on TMT data indicate that Toyota was the only Japanese brand to grow its volume.
  • Passenger cars: the Japanese share slipped from 64.8% to 62.1%, while the Chinese share rose from 18.8% to 22.1%.
  • Commercial vehicles: the Chinese share more than doubled from 7.1% to 16.0%, and the Japanese share fell from 84.4% to 73.8%. This 10.6-point drop is far larger than the 2.7-point drop in passenger cars. In the core one-ton pickup segment (excluding PPVs), however, the Japanese share held at 91.2%, down only slightly from 91.5%. Because the Japanese share of one-ton pickups barely moved, the drop across commercial vehicles likely reflects Chinese gains in other categories, such as PPVs (passenger vehicles built on pickup platforms).

In this tally, “Chinese” covers five groups: BYD, SAIC (MG), Changan, Great Wall Motor and GAC. Chery, Geely, NETA, XPeng and other Chinese brands fall under “others,” so the share of all Chinese brands combined is higher than these figures.

In 2026 the shift continued. At the 47th Bangkok International Motor Show (March 25 to April 5), Chinese brands took 68.1% of the 132,951 four-wheeler bookings placed during the show, more than double the Japanese share of 27.3%, according to JETRO’s tally by nationality of capital (April 15, 2026). BYD led bookings by brand, ahead of Toyota, and 18 of the 40 four-wheeler brands on show were Chinese. Bookings are not sales, but they indicate where buyer intent is moving.

The half-year data point the same way. Per the Federation of Thai Industries (FTI), domestic sales in January to June 2026 reached 346,966 units, up 14.6% year on year. The brand mix is visible in new registrations at the Department of Land Transport (DLT). Based on the unit figures in JETRO’s brand-level tally of DLT data (September 4, 2026), the Japanese share of registrations fell from 72.6% in 2024 to 64.2% in 2025 and 58.7% in the first half of 2026, while the Chinese share rose from 15.2% to 25.8% and 33.0%. Registrations and sales differ in total volume, so these shares cannot be compared directly with the 69.3% sales figure. On the same registration basis, the Japanese share lost more than 8 points over 2025, and the first-half 2026 share was more than 5 points below the 2025 full-year level.

The split by powertrain is now stark. On JETRO’s tally of DLT registrations (August 18, 2026), Chinese makers held a combined 90.3% of the 126,439 battery-electric passenger cars (as classified by the DLT) registered in January to July 2026 (up 88.2% year on year). Japanese makers held 97.8% of the 101,756 hybrid passenger cars registered in the same period (up 22.3% year on year). The full-year 2025 picture was similar: 90.5% of passenger BEV registrations were Chinese, and 96.4% of hybrid registrations were Japanese (JETRO, January 15, 2026). BEVs dominated by Chinese brands, hybrids and pickups dominated by Japanese brands: this is the basic structure of Thailand’s automotive market today.

On the production side, restructuring is under way. Tan Chong Subaru Automotive (Thailand), the assembler of Subaru vehicles, reportedly ended assembly by the end of 2024. Suzuki ended production at its Thai plant at the end of 2025, as announced in June 2024, while keeping sales and after-sales service. Ford Motor Company (Thailand), whose plant adjoins the Suzuki site, reportedly signed an agreement in January 2026 to acquire the former Suzuki plant. Honda announced in July 2024 that it would consolidate vehicle production from its Ayutthaya plant into its Prachinburi plant, and Nissan has merged vehicle assembly at its Plant 1 in Samut Prakan into Plant 2 (both per press reports).

In short, the erosion of Japanese dominance that we described a year ago has proceeded as expected, and the decline in Japanese share continued in 2026. The erosion is uneven, though. Chinese brands account for about 90% of BEVs, and Japanese brands lost more than 10 points in commercial vehicles in 2025, while Japanese brands still hold the large majority of hybrids and one-ton pickups.

Procurement: Chinese Suppliers Cluster in Thailand, but Japanese Suppliers See Little of the New Demand

Next, the supply chain. According to Nikkei, the joint venture between Summit Group and Wuhu Yuefei that Toyota brokered is aimed at a vehicle planned for around 2028. That vehicle is reported to use a multi-pathway platform for EVs, hybrids and other powertrains, not a dedicated EV architecture. The story rests on Nikkei’s sourced reporting. As of October 2026, none of the parties has made an official announcement, and the venture’s name, ownership split, plant location and start of production cannot be confirmed from public information.

Individual projects stay out of view, but Chinese investment in Thailand is visible in the statistics. According to the Thailand Board of Investment (BOI, January 26, 2026), investment promotion applications in 2025 totaled 3,370 projects worth about THB 1.88 trillion, up 67% in value and 11% in number, which the BOI describes as a record. Among foreign applications, those from China totaled 982 projects worth about THB 172.1 billion (US$5.52 billion). By sector, “automotive and parts” accounted for 288 applications worth about THB 84.1 billion. A separate BOI report on projects with at least 10% Chinese capital shows 196 approvals worth about THB 29.8 billion in “machinery and automotive” in 2025. (The reports differ in stage, applications versus approvals, and in sector definitions.)

On supplier numbers, Nikkei reported in August 2025, citing a research firm’s count, that Thailand has about 3,100 auto parts makers, of which about 1,400 are Japanese-affiliated and about 190 Chinese, with the Chinese count four times its end-2017 level. A JETRO regional analysis report (December 19, 2024) documents the arrival of Chinese suppliers, including battery makers Gotion, which announced a plant in Rayong, and SVOLT, which announced a plant in Chonburi.

Is the new demand flowing to Japanese suppliers? As of JETRO’s 2024 survey, rarely. Based on interviews conducted in Thailand and China in 2024, the same JETRO report finds that Chinese automakers in Thailand source mainly from Chinese and local Thai suppliers, and that sourcing from Japanese suppliers is limited. Some Japanese parts makers have won business, the report notes, but not many. For Japanese parts makers hoping to offset lower volumes from Japanese automakers with business from Chinese automakers, that route was narrow at the time of the survey.

Meanwhile, Japanese suppliers have begun to localize electrification components. Aisin announced in March 2025 that its Thai subsidiary would produce hybrid units for Mitsubishi Motors’ hybrid vehicles. Denso has reportedly decided to add an inverter production line at an existing plant in Thailand.

The Unexpected Turn: Shakeout Pressure Builds Among Chinese EV Players

What our report a year ago did not address is the pressure building on the challengers themselves. The emblematic case is NETA. Its sales slump and its parent’s court filing had already begun by then, but the fallout in Thailand has since widened.

Reuters reported on July 4, 2025, citing government data, that new registrations of NETA vehicles fell 48.5% year on year in January to May 2025 and that the brand’s share of EV registrations dropped to 4%. The same report cited a market research firm’s estimate that NETA held around 12% of Thai EV sales at its 2023 peak.

NETA’s parent, Hozon New Energy Automobile, entered court-supervised reorganization (bankruptcy reorganization, a rescue procedure distinct from liquidation) when the Jiaxing Intermediate People’s Court accepted the case on June 12, 2025 and appointed administrators. According to Chinese media, a first reorganization plan with an initial investor failed to pass a creditor vote in December 2025. At a creditors’ meeting in September 2026, a new plan was presented under which a new investor would put in CNY 3 billion for about 70% of the equity. The vote on that plan closed on October 12, 2026. At the time of writing, we could not confirm the result of the vote or court approval. There are no reports of a conversion to liquidation.

The fallout continues in Thailand. According to press reports, the Excise Department said in June 2025 that it was delaying subsidy payments after production stopped at the assembly plant, and in January 2026 it said it would pursue legal action and trace assets over NETA’s unmet local production obligations. In June 2025, 18 NETA dealers reportedly filed complaints with the Excise Department over losses of more than THB 200 million. On September 25, 2026, the Thai government announced that companies that missed their EV3.0 local production obligations must repay the subsidies for the shortfall with 7.5% annual interest (JETRO, October 15, 2026). The same JETRO brief notes that in July 2025 the government had already expected NETA’s Thai unit to miss about 19,000 units of its local production obligation by end-2025. On the consumer side, a class action brought by the Thailand Consumers Council and NETA owners against NETA’s Thai unit and its assembler, Bangchan General Assembly, was accepted by the court in May 2026.

The price war has had side effects of its own. In 2024, repeated price cuts by BYD triggered a backlash from earlier buyers and an official investigation. Reuters reported in November 2024, citing sources, that Thailand’s Office of the Consumer Protection Board had concluded the discounts did not breach advertising law. In February 2026, after the January 2026 registration deadline for EV3.0 subsidies had passed, BYD and other Chinese brands reportedly raised prices in Thailand, which suggests that part of the earlier price competition depended on the subsidies.

Behind all this is crowding. Reuters reported that the number of Chinese EV brands in Thailand doubled in a year to 18 (as of mid-2025), and 18 of the 40 four-wheeler brands at the 2026 motor show were Chinese. In China, Changan Automobile chairman Zhu Huarong said at the company’s results briefing in May 2023 that, on a conservative estimate, 60% to 70% of the country’s auto brands would face closure, merger or transformation within two to three years (per Chinese media). The NETA case suggests that the consolidation expected in China can extend to Thailand.

A note of precision: within the scope of our research, NETA is the only Chinese brand whose Thai operations had effectively stopped as of October 2026. New Chinese entries and local production continue. Press reports say Changan’s Rayong plant began operating in May 2025, BYD’s Rayong plant reached cumulative output of 100,000 vehicles in September 2026, and Li Auto has announced plans to enter Thailand in 2026. What is under way in Thailand’s automotive market is the onset of selection under mounting pressure, not a completed shakeout.

In our view, this selection will lead buyers to ask whether a brand will still be operating in a few years and whether service will be maintained. If so, brand continuity, dealer and service networks, and resale value, all traditional strengths of Japanese brands, may count for more in purchase decisions.

One Year On: Assumptions Versus Facts

IssueSituation and our assessment as of August 2025Confirmed facts as of October 2026
Japanese shareFurther decline expected69.3% for full-year 2025 on a sales basis, below 70%; on a registration basis, 72.6% in 2024, 64.2% in 2025 and 58.7% in H1 2026, so the decline continued
Japanese production footprintSuzuki’s exit and Honda’s consolidation announcedSuzuki ended production at end-2025, and Ford signed to acquire the former plant (press); Honda’s consolidation announced (completion unconfirmed); Nissan merged Plant 1 assembly into Plant 2 (press)
Toyota’s China sourcingJV set up (per Nikkei); sourcing in preparation for a model around 2028No official announcement; JV details and production timing undisclosed
Chinese playersSustained offensive expectedOffensive continues, but the first reorganization plan for NETA’s parent was rejected in December 2025, and subsidy repayment became an issue in Thailand (not covered in our earlier report)
PolicyHybrids a Japanese strength; EV shift inevitable over the long termHybrid excise rates frozen to 2032, conditional on localization investment; EV import incentives ended, repayment required for unmet production obligations, and an excise tied to local value added under discussion (hybrid conditions announced in December 2024; not covered in our earlier report)

The 2026 Environment: Domestic Recovery, Export Decline, and a Policy Divergence

In 2026, domestic demand and exports are moving in opposite directions. In July 2026, the FTI cut its full-year production target from 1.5 million to 1.45 million units. The entire 50,000-unit cut came from export production (950,000 to 900,000), and production for the domestic market was left at 550,000. According to press reports, the FTI cited lower exports amid the conflict in the Middle East, US trade barriers, and competition from Chinese EVs in export markets.

Later data show the same pattern. Per the FTI, production in January to August 2026 was 959,711 units (up 1.3%), of which export production was 605,579 (down 2.9%) and production for the domestic market was 354,132 (up 9.3%) (JETRO, October 7, 2026). Domestic sales in the same period were 465,971 units (up 16.6%), and vehicle exports were 565,037 units (down 6.3%). The FTI said at the end of September that it would keep its 1.45 million production target (per press reports). For reference, 2025 production was 1,455,569 units (down 0.9%).

Export production accounts for over 60% of output, so rising domestic sales combined with falling exports put pressure on automakers with a high export weighting and on their suppliers. Pickup sales also remain weak because of tighter auto lending. An FTI spokesperson said pickup sales in August 2026 fell 10.77% year on year (per press reports).

On policy, two moves in different directions are running at the same time.

The first is conditional support for hybrids. According to the Thai government (December 2024) and BOI materials, the excise rates of 6% for hybrids emitting up to 100 g/km of CO2 and 9% for 101 to 120 g/km will be frozen until 2032 for makers that meet the conditions. Under the standard schedule, these rates would rise by 2 points in 2028 and again in 2030, so the benefit lies in stopping those increases. The conditions are additional investment of at least THB 3 billion in 2024 to 2027; domestic manufacture or assembly of batteries from 2026; domestic sourcing of key components such as traction motors, reduction gears and inverters from 2028; and at least four of six specified advanced driver-assistance features. Support for hybrids comes in exchange for localization investment.

The second concerns how local production obligations for EVs are enforced. Under EV3.5, completely built EVs could be imported with duty reductions and subsidies only in 2024 and 2025. Makers must then build two vehicles locally for each one imported if production takes place in 2026, or three if it slips into 2027. In November 2025, the authorities decided that imported battery cells and modules could count toward local content until end-June 2026, with the cap cut to 10% of ex-factory value from January 2026 (from 15%). The same November 2025 decision also widened the ways to meet obligations: each exported vehicle counts as 1.5 locally built units, contract production at another maker’s plant is allowed, and imported vehicles that received no subsidy can be removed from obligations on payment of the tax difference and a penalty (“Reverse Exit”) (BOI, November 25, 2025).

On September 10, 2026, the National EV Policy Committee agreed in principle on a tiered excise structure: the highest rate for imports with no local production, and lower rates for models with more local value added (BOI, September 2026). According to press reports, the cabinet asked the Excise Department in early October to revise and resubmit the plan, and rates and effective dates had not been set at the time of writing. The sequence that applied through 2025, importing and selling first and building locally later, has ended, and policy discussion is moving toward requiring real local production and local value added.

Our View

Four points follow from the facts above.

First, the defensive line for Japanese automakers is hybrids plus pickups. Hybrids benefit from the excise freeze, and that policy support is conditional. The excise freeze is tied to investment by 2027, local battery assembly from 2026 and local sourcing of key components from 2028. We see the hybrid incentive as a period granted in exchange for localization investment. Pickups, by contrast, rely on market position rather than policy: Japanese brands hold over 90% of the segment, but the market itself is shrinking under tighter lending.

Second, our earlier view needs updating. A year ago we argued that Chinese players could meet Thailand’s local-content rules through local joint ventures and local production, so the rules would not shield Japanese incumbents. Since then, the EV3.5 import incentives have ended on schedule in 2025, unmet production obligations now trigger subsidy repayment with interest, and the excise is being redesigned around local value added. The cost of meeting the rules has risen, and Chinese automakers and suppliers will need to make substantial local investment. At the same time, the ways to meet obligations have widened, so policy is not tightening in one direction only. The rules do not block Chinese entry, but they have begun to separate companies that can sustain local investment from those that cannot. Suppliers able to produce key electrification components locally could see demand from both Japanese and Chinese automakers.

Third, partner selection now requires rigorous diligence. The NETA case shows that market share alone is a poor screen. In NETA’s case, dealers filed complaints over losses with the Excise Department, and the assembler was named in a consumer class action. If a partner fails, disputes over subsidy repayment and unmet production obligations can extend to contract assemblers, dealers and JV partners. Financial strength, the condition of the parent company and the status of subsidy-linked obligations belong in any partnership diligence.

Fourth, the decision horizon. We advise suppliers with Thai operations to plan on three horizons:

  • Short term (1 to 2 years): decisions on orders and investment timed to the excise redesign, EV3.5 production deadlines (2026 to 2027) and the investment deadline for the hybrid incentive (2027).
  • Medium term (roughly 5 to 7 years, through 2032): the period in which hybrid demand and the conditional excise freeze to 2032 continue; the window for portfolio transformation and footprint changes.
  • Long term (around 10 years): decisions on the form in which the business continues as the market shifts toward EVs.

The medium-term window is not a period in which the status quo holds. It is the period in which structural moves, such as portfolio transformation, footprint changes or divestment, can still be executed while the business is profitable. Once policy settles in the short term, the basis for deciding which businesses to keep investing in and which to let go is set, and the medium-term options narrow accordingly.

What This Means for Suppliers and for Investors

For Japanese suppliers in Thailand, the practical agenda has three parts.

  1. Re-examine the local business against the three horizons above. Re-test each year which segments count as defensible: Japanese brands lost more than 10 share points in commercial vehicles in 2025 alone. Japanese brands still hold over 90% of one-ton pickups, but Chinese brands appear to be growing in other categories such as PPVs. Suppliers of hybrid components should track how their customers plan to meet the excise conditions, including local sourcing of key components from 2028, because that will shape their own orders.
  2. Consider partnering with Chinese automakers or suppliers, with the diligence described above. If the reports are accurate, the Summit–Yuefei case shows established local players acting as the host for Chinese entrants. A period of mounting shakeout pressure is also a period in which companies can choose their partners, and the choice should favor partners likely to stay in business.
  3. Treat exit, divestment or carve-out as a legitimate strategic outcome. Terms are better negotiated while the business is still profitable; once orders shrink and losses set in, both the pool of buyers and the price narrow.

For corporates and investors looking at the sector, a notable feature of 2025 and 2026 is a series of transactions involving Thai automotive assets.

  • Ford reportedly signed to acquire the former Suzuki plant next to its own, a sign that a closed plant can still find a buyer.
  • Resonac transferred its automotive molded-parts business in Japan and Thailand to Moriroku, including its Thai subsidiary (announced September 2025, completed April 2026).
  • Bridgestone sold its steel cord businesses in Thailand and China to Bekaert (announced January 2026, completed May 2026).
  • Toyobo announced in August 2026 that it will acquire its partner Indorama’s 50% stake in their Thai airbag-yarn joint venture and make it a wholly owned subsidiary.
  • In February 2026, Bloomberg reported that the founding family of Thai Summit Group, a major Thai auto parts maker, was weighing a sale of the business at up to US$2 billion. The company denied the report. (Thai Summit Group is a separate corporate group from the Summit Group mentioned earlier in this report.)

Sales of businesses, carve-outs and the restructuring of JV stakes are all in active use in Thailand. For companies with Thai operations, weighing options other than holding on is now a practical consideration.

Whichever path a company takes, the review should start while options are still plentiful. As this report shows, the structural change in Thailand’s automotive market has followed the direction we expected a year ago. Over the next one to two years, as the excise redesign and production deadlines take effect, customers’ sourcing policies and the viability of individual Chinese players will become clearer. If order prospects deteriorate in the process, both the pool of partners and buyers and the available terms will narrow, and we expect the range of options to narrow with them.

About Syntax Partners

Syntax Partners is a Japan-based M&A advisory firm. We provide advice and execution support on cross-border M&A, capital alliances and restructuring across Asia, with a focus on Southeast Asia.

In M&A, we act exclusively as a financial advisor and support only one side, the seller or the buyer, in any given transaction. On sell-side mandates, we act as an advisor dedicated to maximizing value for sellers and owners: we approach overseas strategic and financial buyers as well as Japanese companies, and we support the process from negotiation through closing. On buy-side mandates, we research and build target lists based on the client’s strategy, approach owners and parent companies directly, negotiate, and execute the transaction.

Our services include:

  • M&A and capital alliance advisory in ASEAN markets (sell side and buy side)
  • Local partner search
  • Restructuring, carve-out and PMI support
  • Industry analysis, market research and strategy development
  • Procurement strategy and supply chain review

Whether you are re-examining a Thai operation, searching for a partner or considering a divestment, we welcome inquiries at any stage, including early, informal consultations.

Related Links

Sources

  • Toyota Motor Thailand (TMT), 2025 sales results (January 30, 2026)
  • Federation of Thai Industries (FTI), production and sales statistics (January to August 2026) and 2026 production target revision (July 2026)
  • JETRO business briefs (2025 production and sales, February 5, 2026; Bangkok International Motor Show, April 15, 2026; passenger BEV and HEV registrations, January 15 and August 18, 2026; vehicle production, October 7, 2026; EV subsidy repayment, October 15, 2026)
  • JETRO regional analysis reports on Chinese BEV-related suppliers in Thailand (December 19, 2024) and on Thailand’s auto industry (September 4, 2026)
  • Thailand Board of Investment (BOI), 2025 investment promotion statistics (January 26, 2026); EV3/EV3.5 revisions (November 25, 2025); National EV Policy Committee decision (September 2026); HEV and MHEV excise measures
  • BOI report on projects with Chinese capital (January to December 2025)
  • Royal Thai Government, announcement on National EV Policy Committee decisions (December 4, 2024)
  • Chinese media reports and related listed-company disclosures on Hozon New Energy Automobile’s reorganization (2025 to 2026)
  • Reuters (July 4, 2025, on NETA and the Thai EV market; November 29, 2024, on the Consumer Protection Board investigation of BYD)
  • Yicai and Jiemian (May 2023, remarks by Changan Automobile chairman Zhu Huarong)
  • Bloomberg (February 4, 2026, report on Thai Summit Group)
  • Company announcements (Suzuki, Aisin, Resonac, Bridgestone, Bekaert, Toyobo)
  • Thailand Consumers Council (NETA owners’ class action, May 2026)
  • Thai and Chinese press reports (Excise Department and dealer actions, Chinese brands’ price increases, Changan and BYD plants, Li Auto, Ford’s acquisition of the former Suzuki plant, Honda and Nissan consolidation, Denso, FTI outlook, cabinet referral, 2024 to 2026)
  • Nikkei, “Toyota to source Chinese parts in Thailand: a turning point for Japanese supply chains” (August 2, 2025)